By Claire Willman, Executive Assistant to the Director-General and Chief Executive
If one were asked to picture a person with a gun, of the many images that may come to mind – a soldier or police officer, a member of a rebel militia or gang, a sniper or a hunter – it is unlikely to be a woman. Indeed, a much smaller number of gun owners are women. In the United States, for example, men are three times as likely as women to personally own a gun, by 37% to 12%. Worldwide, men are six times more likely to commit armed murder than women. They are also more likely to be killed by a gun, representing 90% of small-arms homicide victims.
But women are disproportionately the victims of the effects of armed violence. The new Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) contains provisions that are meant to address this reality, but the treaty language may prevent it from succeeding.
The ATT, approved by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and opened for signature on Monday 3 June, will regulate the multi-billion-dollar global trade in ‘conventional weapons’ – including small arms, light weapons, landmines, shells, rockets and missiles. The ATT is the first treaty to acknowledge the link between the arms trade and its effect on women worldwide. Article 7.4 obligates states to ‘take into account the risk of the conventional arms … being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children’. As such, preventing ‘gender-based violence’ is a legally binding consideration for the export process.
The treaty recognises that women suffer hugely as a result of conflict, whether through fatalities, injury, widowhood, displacement and economic deprivation resulting from conflict. Women are also predominantly the victims of sexual violence that accompanies conflict. Female Bosnian victims of rape during the 1990s Balkan conflict are estimated to number between 20,000 and 50,000; the figure for the 1994 Rwandan genocide is a quarter of a million, and for the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) the figure is as high as one million.
However, a country does not have to be at war for women to suffer the effects of armed violence. In a 2003 study, the presence of a gun in a US home was found to increase a man’s chances of sustaining fatal injuries by 41%, but a woman’s by 272%, because of the prevalence of domestic assaults. Domestic violence is widespread, responsible for anywhere between 40-70% of female homicide victims. The proliferation of guns plays a significant role in facilitating human trafficking, which mainly involves female victims.
While admirable in its attempt, however, the ATT’s gender provision has its critics. A particular issue with Article 7.4 is that its language, bracketing ‘women and children’ as a group, defines women as de facto vulnerable, and fails to recognise the key roles they can play in conflict. Women can undoubtedly be guilty of violence themselves, whether participating in combat or crime, or facilitating the violent behaviour of others.
They also have an important role to play in enacting the treaty in the areas of conflict resolution and disarmament, much like female peace activists in Liberia.
Article 7.4 on gender-based violence comes under Article 7, setting out the factors that states are obligated to consider when exporting to other nations. They must assess whether arms exports could ‘contribute to or undermine peace and security’. The language is problematic, because peace and security can be ambiguous, perhaps even subjective concepts, and how states choose to frame the treaty obligations could vary.
A country does not have to be at war to be violent. More people were fatally shot in Brazil in 2005 than during the first three years of the Iraq War. Neither Bangladesh nor South Africa are at war, but in the latter, a woman is killed by a domestic partner every eight hours; in the former, a WHO study found that nearly half of women interviewed in rural areas reported being raped by their husbands. Exporting arms to these regions could further threaten women’s security.
Article 7.4 is a significant step forward, but fails to address important realities of armed violence and its associated effect on women. An international enforcement mechanism is also lacking. The treaty’s gender-based-violence provision serves as a potent example of why, for many, the ambitious ATT is at once an historic victory for regulating the arms trade, but may fall short of its ambitions and purpose.
Tensions have subsided on the Korean peninsula since Pyongyang withdrew its Musadan missiles from its east-coast launch site earlier this month, and the US and China have turned their attention to more pressing issues.
But the next time North Korea increases tensions, the United States will again look to China to rein in its ally. And Beijing might look for concessions in return, writes IISS’s Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga for the China–US Focus website.
‘China is able to wield North Korea as leverage because the Obama administration has outsourced its North Korea policy to Beijing,’ he argues.
The Obama administration’s policy of ‘strategic patience’ has failed to accomplish its intended goal of curbing North Korean provocations. Making Pyongyang’s cessation of hostilities a condition for direct US–North Korea contact leaves the United States no choice but to court Beijing for solutions.
It could be time for the United States to approach Pyongyang directly, particularly because Beijing may no longer be interested in bargaining.
‘The US “rebalancing” to Asia has increased Chinese suspicions of US intensions in the region, and thereby reduced Chinese goodwill to cooperate on resolving the North Korea issue, leaving Beijing seeking compensation for cooperation,’ he adds.
‘The United States can decrease the value of North Korea as a Chinese bargaining chip by increasing dialogue with China on US intensions in the region and by reclaiming its North Korea policy through reviving direct talks with the Kim regime.’
Read the full article.
By Christian Le Miere, Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security
Although the Shangri-La Dialogue will hold much of the Institute’s – and international – attention over the coming week, the IISS will remain active on other issues.
Yesterday, the IISS’ Bahrain office held the NATO Gulf Strategic Dialogue, bringing together a range of practitioners and academics, and in just under a week the Geo-Economics and Strategy Programme will run a seminar on Oil, Gas and Maritime Security.
The timing of these two sessions is not entirely coincidental. Just last week, the US Navy wrapped up its second annual two-week International Mine Counter-Measures Exercise (IMCMEX). Involving participants from 41 different countries, the exercises are essentially a form of deterrent diplomacy.
By Dr Sanjaya Baru, Director for Geo-economics and Strategy
India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrives in Tokyo this week for what may well be his most important foreign visit in his second term in office. The visit’s importance derives as much from the particular economic interests of India and Japan, as both economies seek to boost growth, trade and investment, as it does from the realisation that they must work together to temper China’s ‘new assertiveness’ in its neighbourhood.
Confluence of the two seas
After a gap of nearly six years, there may once again be a meeting of minds between Prime Minister Singh and his host, Japan’s bold ‘new’ leader Shinzo Abe, who, during his first term in office in 2006–07, took the initiative to seek a ‘new relationship’ with India.
On a visit in August 2007, he told the Indian Parliament that Japan had ‘rediscovered’ India ‘as a partner that shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that will work alongside us to enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity, which will be open and transparent to all’.
In his national security speech on 23 May, President Obama may have focused on the specific issues of the Guantanamo detention centre and drone strikes, but he also used the speech to set out a new approach to national security and counter-terrorism that his administration has been working towards for the past four years.
This speech could mark the point at which the US government begins to shift away from a counter-terrorism approach that has become excessive and unsustainable, towards one that enables resources to be redirected towards more salient national-security issues. Obama noted that the United States could not remain at war forever and needed an exit strategy; the threat from terrorism was now from ‘lethal, yet less capable, al-Qaeda affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, homegrown extremists’.
The increase in US oil and natural gas production could have a dramatic effect on world energy markets, according to Dr Pierre Noel, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Economic and Energy Security at IISS–Asia.
Dr Noel appeared on CNN yesterday to discuss the future of the global oil market, the effect of sanctions against Iran, and new figures released by the International Energy Agency indicating increased oil and gas production in the United States.
‘US unconventional liquid supply is growing by a million barrels a day each year, which has the potential to revive the growth of non-OPEC supplies,’ he explained. The effect on future oil prices however is unclear, and ‘depends on the supply–demand balance, and it is very difficult to know what’s ahead of us’, he said.
‘Demand is growing rapidly in emerging economies: China, India but also Southeast Asia – so you may actually need this rise in unconventional supply, especially if other parts of the supply picture disappoint.’ US and EU sanctions against Iran, for example, might also make this unconventional supply a necessity.
Dr Noel discussed the effect the sanctions might have on the Iranian presidential elections in June. He explained that the latest round of sanctions were ‘working’ – meaning that the situation was getting harder for the Iranian population – but that this would not necessarily mean the public would choose a leader more open to engaging with the West. ‘The risk that I see politically is that a larger and larger share of the population will actually reward a politician tempted by a hardening of the Iranian position, rather than a softening,’ he said.
He also discussed the security impact that a hard-line Iranian position would have on the region, explaining that Iran’s neighbours were worried about the connection between Iran and the crisis in Syria. ‘I think the governments in this part of the world see the future as a very risky one geopolitically,’ he added.
Watch the video.
For more on this topic, watch the IISS’s May 15 panel discussion on the future of the Middle East oil environment, and read the IISS Strategic Comment on the United States’ falling need for foreign oil.
By Suvi Dogra, Research and Liaison Officer, Geo-economics and Strategy Programme
From the Antarctic to the Arctic?
Over 30 years ago, India surprised the world with its expedition to the Antarctic. It may have surprised once again by securing observer status at the Arctic Council – a grouping of Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US). For months, the Arctic Council has been debating the issue of admitting observers to its gatherings. Last week the Council decided to admit six new observers ̶ China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea. Interestingly, the EU has not yet been admitted.
While the observers have no say in the decision-making process, this inclusion is significant, because it shows the Arctic Council is no longer defining itself in geographic terms and has factored in geo-economic elements. The economic rise of China and India is bound to impact on the Arctic region, both through global warming and their widening maritime footprint and interest in the Arctic’s vast oil and gas resources.
These days, there are not many things that Arabs agree on. In fact, it may be fair to say they agree to disagree more often than not when it comes to regional policy. But Iran, once the darling of the Arab Street, is finding both popular and government opinion turning against it. And at the heart of the matter lies official Iranian attitude towards sectarianism and the Syrian uprising.
For years, Iran, and especially Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, enjoyed the unwavering support of the Arab general public, especially following the 2006 war in Lebanon. Many perceived Iran as the outspoken guardian of the Muslim world; a country that had the guts to oppose compromise in the Arab-Israeli peace process and support Hizbullah in its struggle against Israel. But this is no longer the case, and Iran knows it.
So the Iranian regime is trying to regain some positive influence. It’s partly why Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi was in Amman, Jordan, recently to meet Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh and King Abdullah II. Jordan’s government welcomed the opportunity to discuss Syria with their Iranian counterparts. But the response was different in Parliament: Bassam al-Manaseer, chairman of the Arab and Foreign Relations Committee of the Jordanian Parliament, called the visit ‘unwelcomed’ and expressed his concerns over ‘suspicious’ Iranian activities in the region.
Read the full article in the Atlantic
By Mona Moussavi, Editorial assistant
This year’s Iranian presidential election race got a lot more interesting last Saturday when former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani registered his candidacy just minutes before the deadline.
The move transforms the race to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who cannot stand in June’s poll after serving two full terms. Rafsanjani has a turbulent relationship with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. And despite being a conservative, he is attractive to reformers as a relative moderate in contemporary Iran.
Attention is now on Khamenei to see how he responds. The more than 600 candidates who have registered to run must all be vetted by the Guardian Council. Khamenei holds sway over the council, which comprises six clergymen directly appointed by the supreme leader, and six jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary (himself appointed by the supreme leader).
By Kiran Hassan, Research assistant, South Asia Programme
Can a third-time prime minister rescue a nation in trouble? This is a question being asked about Nawaz Sharif since his party won the most number of votes in historic elections in Pakistan last weekend.
The poll – in which one elected Pakistani government succeeded another for the first time since independence in 1947 – leaves Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League–N (PML–N) in charge of a country plagued by terrorist attacks, corruption and daily power outages. Sharif has already made it clear that the economy will be his top priority, but his campaign promise to force the United States to cut back drone attacks on Pakistani soil – albeit now softened – remains in the news.
Sharif and the PML–N saw off a plucky challenge by former cricketer Imran Khan and his Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI), and should now be able to govern alone without needing to form a coalition.
Pakistan’s youthful population meant there were 36 million registered new voters among a total 86m; and voter turnout was substantial, at 60%, including a large proportion of women. Although more than 100 people lost their lives in election-related violence, the Taliban failed to significantly disrupt the vote.
However, Sharif’s two previous unpopular terms in the 1990s hang over him, and his party’s victory in this election rests almost entirely on its success in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province.