Two weeks after sending troops to Mali to repel an advance by Islamist rebels, France has enjoyed much tactical success. French and Malian forces have retaken Timbuktu and Gao, and are now reported to have reached the last Islamist stronghold, Kidal. The main challenges ahead include sustaining these gains, bolstering the Malian military and improving governance.
But these tactical achievements come despite a continuing fragility within some French military capabilities: the limited availability of so-called ‘air platform force enablers’ in general, and a paucity of strategic airlift in particular. This general shortfall afflicts many other European countries, and in the case of strategic airlift is only now being fixed.
By Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace
The end of this year could well be marked by the sale of a European fighter to a Gulf Cooperation Council state: Oman. A long-awaited deal may well be concluded for Muscat to buy 12 Eurofighter Typhoons to complement its existing fleet of US-built F-16s. With US and European defence budgets under pressure for the foreseeable future, combat aircraft manufacturers are pursuing any export opportunity with increasing vigour. And there remains the tantalising possibility for the four Eurofighter nations – Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK – of a larger order in the United Arab Emirates.
National political constraints have caused the collapse of the planned merger of two of Europe’s main aerospace and defence companies, EADS and BAE Systems.
The deal foundered despite what the two companies said was the ‘sound industrial logic’ of the proposed deal. Following negotiations involving the British, French and German governments, the two companies said on 10 October: ‘It has become clear that the interests of the parties’ government stakeholders cannot be adequately reconciled with each other or with the objectives that BAE Systems and EADS had established.’
They had intended to create a company with the size and spread of the US’s Boeing, centred around the Airbus civil aircraft maker but with a strong presence in the global defence manufacturing market. This, indeed, had been the goal of different British, French and German governments as long ago as 1997. On that occasion, an all-British defence merger got in the way of a plan to create a European aerospace and defence champion.
By Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace
The ebb and flood of transatlantic defense relations has long been in evidence at the Farnborough air show, at the political and industrial level both. A question on the minds of many of the more than 100,000 daily attendees will be just how low the spending tide could eventually drop, as Washington’s interest is now focused firmly on another ocean while Europe flounders in debt.
The 2012 show is the aerospace and defence industry’s first full opportunity to come together since the U.S. administration’s revised strategic guidance outlined ‘re-balancing’ toward the Asia Pacific, while sustaining its commitment in the Middle East. Europe, for more than half a century the preoccupation of US defence interest, also became the subject of a “strategic opportunity to re-balance.” In keeping with the general tenor of the defence debate in Europe this is certain to be in terms of a withdrawal. Read the rest of this entry »
It seems to have been a case of ‘decide in haste and repent at leisure’ for Britain’s government, which this week changed its mind on the version of F-35 jet to buy for the UK’s next aircraft carrier – reverting to the model chosen by the previous administration that it previously pilloried as the wrong choice.
The Conservative-led government overturned Labour’s choice of the F-35B (pictured) – a vertical take-off and landing (STOVL) aircraft like the Harrier jump jet it was designed to replace – as part of its Strategic Defence and Security Review in October 2010. It decided to switch to the conventional take-off and landing F-35C, and to equip one of two new aircraft carriers under construction with the catapult and arrestor equipment needed to launch and recover it.
Shortly before Britain controversially began a decade with no carrier strike capability, Prime Minister David Cameron told parliament that the new aircraft carriers ordered by Labour were ‘unable to work effectively with our key defence partners, the United States or France’. He added that the F-35B jets Labour chose to fly off the carriers were a ‘more expensive and less capable version of the Joint Strike Fighter’.
By Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace
It has been a rough week for the Missile Technology Control Regime. On the MTCR’s twenty-fifth birthday, on 16 April, North Korea paraded a previously unseen long-range ballistic missile through the streets of Pyongyang and showed off some kind of unmanned system. Days later, South Korea was saying it had deployed an extended-range variant of its ground-launched cruise missile, and India had successfully test-fired an Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile. Perhaps the MTCR’s only lucky day recently has been Friday the thirteenth, when North Korea’s Unha-3 satellite launch vehicle failed shortly after launch.
The MTCR keeps a low profile and so far hasn’t publicly marked its twenty-fifth. It was set up in 1987 by the United States and six other countries to try to curtail the proliferation of rocket, missile, unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs or ‘drones’) and technology capable of delivering a 500 kilogram payload at a range greater than 300 kilometres. If events on the Asian continent were inauspicious markers of the MTCR’s quarter-century, they were a reminder of the rationale for establishing the non-proliferation regime.
By Douglas Barrie Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace
Intelligence and nuclear collaboration are two pillars of the long-term defence relationship between London and Washington. Recent cuts in the UK military have raised questions about whether London can uphold up its end of the bargain. But US budget documents released last month show that the US and UK continue to collaborate in the particularly sensitive area of electronic signals intelligence, or SIGINT.