Egypt exits non-proliferation meeting
Posted: 02/05/2013 Filed under: Gulf and Middle East Security, Jenny Nielsen, Non-Proliferation | Tags: 2013 PrepCom, Arab League, Egypt, Geneva, MEWMDFZ, non-proliferation treaty, NPT 1 Comment »
By Jenny Nielsen, Research Analyst, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Egypt has walked out of talks on the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) this week, over the slow progress on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ).
The unprecedented move presents a serious headache for the non-proliferation regime. Announcing his delegation’s withdrawal from the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference (2013 NPT PrepCom) on Monday, Egyptian Ambassador Hisham Badr warned that despite being a strong supporter of the NPT regime, Cairo was dissatisfied with the international community’s ‘lack of seriousness’ in establishing an MEWMDFZ and ‘very concerned about the ramification of the non-fulfilment of commitments on the credibility and sustainability of the NPT regime’.
Sarin in Syria: what standard of proof?
Posted: 26/04/2013 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation | Tags: Aleppo, Barack Obama, Bashar al-Assad, Chemical Weapons, Homs, Syria 3 Comments »
Damascus. Photo Credit: Flickr/sharnik.
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Yesterday US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said it was likely that chemical weapons (CW) had been used on a ‘small scale’ in Syria. President Obama claimed in August that the use of CW in Syria would change his calculus on US intervention, but the intelligence must be examined carefully to assess whether his ‘red line’ on CW has actually been crossed.
On Thursday, the White House said that although it was likely the nerve gas sarin had been used, the evidence was still too thin and that it needed ‘credible and corroborated facts’. President Obama is being pilloried in some quarters for not following through on his earlier red line. But after the misuse of intelligence to justify an invasion of Iraq ten years ago, the bar for concluding that Assad used chemical weapons must naturally be set high. The standard of evidence should meet at least three conditions: clear-cut evidence of use, meaningful quantity, and purposefulness.
An A-Z of the NPT preparatory committee
Posted: 23/04/2013 Filed under: Jenny Nielsen, Non-Proliferation | Tags: non-proliferation, NPT, nuclear, nuclear disarmament, preparatory committee, prepcom, RevCon, review conference, treaty Leave a comment »
Putting back the Doomsday clock
By Jenny Nielsen, Research Analyst, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Acronym alert! Until 3 May, the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be meeting at the United Nations (UN) in Geneva.
Still with us? The following alphabetical lists provides a flavour of what can be expected at this two-week gathering of states parties to the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Agenda
Unlike some previous PrepComs (e.g. 2007), this session already has one – which should avoid procedural delays.
Boycott?
The Arab League considered boycotting this year’s committee after the 2012 Helsinki conference on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone was postponed. Arab states will now attend, but remain unhappy about the lack of progress on an MEWMDFZ.
Bushehr quake revives nuclear safety fears
Posted: 11/04/2013 Filed under: Gulf and Middle East Security, Michael Elleman, Non-Proliferation | Tags: Bushehr, Bushehr nuclear power plant, earthquake, Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, nuclear accident, nuclear energy, nuclear reactor, nuclear safety, radiation, Tehran, uranium 1 Comment »
Bushehr nuclear reactor. Photo: Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
By Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Regional Security Cooperation, IISS-Middle East
Gulf leaders have long been concerned that a serious accident at the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr could expose their citizens to radiation. Bushehr’s location in an area of high seismic activity adds to public anxiety over the reactor’s safety. And on Tuesday, nerves were rattled when a magnitude 6.3 earthquake centred less than 100 kilometres from Bushehr killed at least 37 people, injured hundreds and destroyed homes. The quake was felt across the Gulf in Dubai, Qatar and Bahrain.
Officials tried to reassure observers. ‘The earthquake in no way affected the normal situation at the reactor,’ the Russian company that built the Bushehr reactor, Atomstroyexport, told news agency RIA Novosti. ‘Personnel continue to work in the normal regime and radiation levels are fully within the norm.’ Mahmoud Jafari, a project manager at the plant, insisted to Iranian state media that the quake ‘didn’t create any complications’.
Trident debate resurfaces
Posted: 05/04/2013 Filed under: Europe, Non-Proliferation | Tags: David Cameron, deterrence, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons, trident, UK 1 Comment »
Nuclear Submarine HMS Vanguard Passes HMS Dragon as She Returns to HMNB Clyde, Scotland. Photo Credit: Ministry of Defense
By Jenny Nielsen, Research Analyst, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
UK prime minister David Cameron has prompted a small resurgence of the UK’s nuclear debate by publishing a letter in The Daily Telegraph on April 3, asserting that the country must maintain and renew its nuclear deterrent system in the face of global instability. But the debate should not end there: as discussed in a recent IISS panel on the subject, the UK must consider the costs of replacing the deterrent and the resulting effects on its conventional military capabilties. No less importantly, it also needs to take into account the implications renewing its nuclear deterrent might have on global non-proliferation efforts.
In his letter, which coincides with the 100th patrol of the four Vanguard-class submarines that carry the UK’s Trident nuclear missiles, Cameron argued that retaining an independent nuclear deterrent is now more important than ever. He contends that ‘the nuclear threat has not gone away … in terms of uncertainty and potential risk it has, if anything, increased’. He also warned that ‘there is real risk of new nuclear-armed states emerging’.
Yongbyon restart: North Korea’s new threat
Posted: 02/04/2013 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation, Transnational threats and political risk | Tags: enrichment, North Korea, nuclear reactor, putonium, Pyongyang, restart, uranium, Yongbyon Leave a comment »
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Among Pyongyang’s recent inflated threats, the announced intention to ‘readjust and restart’ its nuclear facilities is the most worrisome.
If implemented, North Korea will be producing both kinds of fissile material that can create nuclear explosions: plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
The handful of nuclear weapons – from four to 10 – that North Korea presumably already possesses are based on plutonium that was produced at the small 5MW reactor at Yongbyon prior to mid-2007.
Whether it also has uranium weapons is unknown.
Why North Korea abandoned the plutonium programme and instead prioritised uranium enrichment has been a mystery.
Uncertain chemical-weapons claims in Syria
Posted: 21/03/2013 Filed under: Dina Esfandiary, Gulf and Middle East Security, Non-Proliferation | Tags: Bashar al-Assad, Chemical Weapons, civil war, mustard gas, Sarin, Syria, Syrian rebels, US Leave a comment »
The Syrian city of Aleppo
Dina Esfandiary, Research Associate and Project Coordinator of the IISS Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme, has an article in The Diplomat analysing recent claims of chemical-weapons use in Syria.
Syria’s state news agency, SANA, made the first allegations on Tuesday when it broadcast pictures of alleged chemical-weapons victims having difficulty breathing and foaming at the mouth, in what it reported was the result of a ’terrorist’ rocket attack near Aleppo. The Russian Foreign Ministry then released a statement confirming the opposition’s use of chemical weapons, but presented no evidence to support this claim. An opposition commander also said he had heard secondhand reports that victims were having respiratory problems in response to a chemical attack, but he said the regime was responsible.
What we actually know is patchy, says Esfandiary. Despite ‘proof’ from both sides in the form of photos and videos, there is nothing that shows the attack site, and no indication that any of the victims’ symptoms match those that would result from exposure to mustard gas, Sarin or VX – Syria’s alleged chemical-weapons arsenal – which would have more devastating effects than those reported.
If the use of chemical weapons is confirmed, it could change the character of the conflict because the US and the international community would be pressured to intervene, explains Esfandiary. The US and Europe are therefore rightly proceeding with caution. ‘But if anything, this event reiterates how little is known about the situation on the ground in Syria,’ Esfandiary argues. When the West can be sure of so little, perhaps the real debate should be whether or not it should be arming the rebels.
Read the full article at The Diplomat
The debate about Trident
Posted: 20/03/2013 Filed under: Alexa van Sickle, Europe, Non-Proliferation | Tags: debate, disarmament, foreign policy, NPT, nuclear deterrent, Trident nuclear weapons system, Trident replacement Leave a comment »
By Alexa van Sickle, Assistant editor
It was, several older colleagues told me, one of the most thought-provoking discussions they had heard at the institute. With Britain’s ageing Trident nuclear deterrent in the news again – as defence cuts bite and a divided coalition government reviews the options for a replacement system – four of the United Kingdom’s most respected former civil servants came to Arundel House last week and delivered a one-and-half-hour masterclass in nuclear policy.
Nuclear escalation in South Asia
Posted: 12/03/2013 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation, South Asia | Tags: Cold Start doctrine, deterrence, fissile material, India, nuclear posture, Pakistan, tactical nuclear weapons Leave a comment »
India’s presumed ‘Cold Start’ doctrine posits limited incursions over the border into Pakistan
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
During visits to New Delhi and Islamabad last week, I was disheartened by some of the discussions I had on nuclear doctrine. In both capitals, a dominant theme was the perceived need to restore credible deterrence, with seemingly little consideration for the implications of sparking a nuclear war.
In New Delhi, leading members of the strategic community insisted that the restraint India had shown after terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2008 linked to Pakistani officialdom only encouraged further attacks. They argued that when Pakistan-based terrorists struck again – and without doubt the question was when, not if – India would have to respond forcefully ‘to teach them a lesson’.
In Islamabad, ‘plugging the deterrence gap’ was the reason given for Pakistan’s recent pursuit of battlefield nuclear weapons. India’s presumed ‘Cold Start’ doctrine (or ‘proactive strategy’ as it is now called) posits rapid mobilisation and limited incursions across the border into Pakistan. In Islamabad this was considered to be a fully resourced plan and a cunning way to attempt aggression without triggering a strategic nuclear response.
Can China end the DPRK’s nuclear blackmail?
Posted: 19/02/2013 Filed under: Asia Pacific, Non-Proliferation, William Choong | Tags: China, condemnation, North Korea, nuclear programme, sanctions Leave a comment »
By Dr William Choong, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security
Members of the United Nations Security Council, including China, have strongly condemned North Korea’s nuclear test last week, and that rare unanimity could be useful for regional security. If China were to put pressure on North Korea (an historic development that looks possible) while the United Nations Security Council tightened the vice of sanctions, perhaps Pyongyang could be pressured to at least suspend further tests?
This, however, is probably not to be. North Korea has maintained its missile and nuclear programmes as a going concern for years, despite a growing raft of sanctions. In addition, sanctions have done little to change the decision-making of other worrisome countries such as Iran.
