An A-Z of the NPT preparatory committee
Posted: 23/04/2013 Filed under: Jenny Nielsen, Non-Proliferation | Tags: non-proliferation, NPT, nuclear, nuclear disarmament, preparatory committee, prepcom, RevCon, review conference, treaty Leave a comment »
Putting back the Doomsday clock
By Jenny Nielsen, Research Analyst, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Acronym alert! Until 3 May, the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be meeting at the United Nations (UN) in Geneva.
Still with us? The following alphabetical lists provides a flavour of what can be expected at this two-week gathering of states parties to the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Agenda
Unlike some previous PrepComs (e.g. 2007), this session already has one – which should avoid procedural delays.
Boycott?
The Arab League considered boycotting this year’s committee after the 2012 Helsinki conference on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone was postponed. Arab states will now attend, but remain unhappy about the lack of progress on an MEWMDFZ.
Obama’s second chance at Prague nuke agenda
Posted: 08/11/2012 Filed under: Gulf and Middle East Security, Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation, US | Tags: Barack Obama, Iran, non-proliferation, nuclear, Russia, START, US presidential election 1 Comment »
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
The US electorate has spoken, and most of the international diplomats, academics, and others with whom I spoke on the day after our presidential election on 6 November breathed a sigh of relief that the stewardship of the world’s (still) sole superpower will remain in safe hands for another four years. The rest of the world famously backed Barack Obama, so while much of the satisfaction I heard about the Democrat’s re-election pertained particularly to the nuclear-policy matters being addressed in my various meetings, I also found myself, as an American citizen abroad, congratulated more broadly.
The election turned on domestic issues, and even the presidential debate that was supposed to be dedicated to foreign policy pivoted back to the American economy and education system. Nevertheless, the question that I have been asked most is how Obama will use his renewed lease on the White House to address global issues. In my area of specialisation on arms control and non-proliferation, everyone agrees there is much to be done. Unfortunately, there seems little scope for Obama to do it. And, of course, Iran looms large on his agenda.
Tehran’s nuclear balancing act
Posted: 18/09/2012 Filed under: Gulf and Middle East Security, Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation | Tags: IAEA, Iran, Israel, nuclear, nuclear sites 2 Comments »
Tehran at sunrise, featuring the Miladi Tower. Photo Credit: Flickr Creative Commons/Afshin Rattansi
In an issue of the Security Times that coincided with the Cyber Security Summit in Bonn, Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, examined Iran’s nuclear balancing act.
There is no diplomatic solution for Iran’s nuclear ambitions yet, and while Iran has been somewhat hampered by sanctions and attacks designed to derail its nuclear program, it continues to enrich uranium. As the IAEA reported, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile grew to nearly 7,000kg. Iran is still months away from being able to make a weapons, but ‘the problem is that the redline separating nuclear-capable from nuclear-armed will become less clear as Iran’s enrichment program makes further advances,’ writes Fitzpatrick.
Diplomatic talks by the EU3+3 have failed. Differing perceptions of the threat by Israel and the US may have delayed more decisive plans, but in this atmosphere of uncertainty, an Israeli strike cannot be ruled out. For now, a military attack still seems like the worst option, as well as counterproductive – because it may only derail Iran’s progress by two to three years, and ultimately accelerate Iran’s ambitions for a weapon. But Iran should not push its luck. The US seems to be unwilling to join Israel in an attack now, but could very well change its position in the near future. If Western intelligence agencies begin to perceive more of a threat, they could strike – which could lead to war.
Para-diplomacy with Iran and Russia
Posted: 10/09/2012 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation | Tags: IAEA, Iran, Israel, nuclear, Russia 1 Comment »
2012 Nuclear Security Summit Plenary Hall. Copyright: IAEA Imagebank
Photo Credit: Dean Calma / IAEA
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
At a non-proliferation conference in Moscow on Friday, I questioned Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov about his interview with Interfax the previous day in which he claimed that Russia saw ‘no signs’ of a military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme. Was this a misinterpretation, I asked. In English, ‘signs’ mean ‘indications’. Maybe he meant there was no proof?
There are plenty of indications, I added. The report by the IAEA last November included a 65-paragraph annex detailing the information the agency has assembled about Iranian nuclear activities of a ‘possible military dimension’. Most of the evidence concerned activities prior to 2004, but some suspicious activity took place after that time and possibly continues today. As I have put it elsewhere, surely the Russians are not blind to that evidence.
Answering in perfect English, Ryabkov doubled down on his insistence of ‘no signs, full stop’. Afterwards, two of my Russian friends privately shook their heads at this feigned ignorance. To put the best spin on it, I surmise that Ryabkov’s purpose was to dampen the heat that has been generated of late over the Iranian nuclear issue. But how far backwards is it seemly to bend in order to give Iran the benefit of the doubt?
The Iranian nuclear issue is assessed in detail in the newly published IISS Strategic Survey 2012. At the book launch this Thursday, I will be ready to offer an update on the latest diplomatic peregrinations, the state of Iran’s programme and the guessing game over Israel’s intentions. Will they or won’t they prematurely – and fatally – take military action? Sneak preview: probably not this year, but don’t bet the farm on peace prevailing next year. As we note at the end of the Iran section of Strategic Survey 2012: ‘No matter who won the US presidential election, the Iranian nuclear issue looked likely to reach a crisis stage in the coming year.’
At the Moscow conference, Ryabkov said Iran needs to cooperate more with the IAEA to remove doubt about their actions. He added that as difficult as the talks with Iran may be, ‘some talks are better than no talks’ and that for the first time Iran was discussing core issues. Russia had proposed a step-by-step plan that in the end would meet Iran’s demand for the lifting of sanctions and recognition of an Iranian right to enrichment. The sequencing is important, he added, and is one of the areas of disagreement with Iran.
In a luncheon address at the conference, Mustafa Dolatyar, Director General of Iran’s Institute for Political and International Studies, confirmed that Iran wanted these concessions up front. The soft-spoken diplomat/professor couched these demands in honeyed terms of good faith, respect for each other’s choices and transparency on the desired end game. As I see it though, agreement on the outcome should be the result of negotiations, not a precondition for meaningful talks.
Dolatyar also spoke about what he claimed to be America’s missed opportunities over the years at responding in kind to Iran’s offers of flexibility. Goodness knows there were too many such missed opportunities on all sides. His focus on America, though, was irritating to the representatives of other countries that share Washington’s concerns.
During the ensuing Q & A, rather than offer a point-by-point rebuttal of his accusations about past US actions, I asked a simple question about the present: Why does Iran refuse to meet bilaterally with the US and to respond to President Barack Obama’s offer of engagement? Since Iran is so focused on America’s position, would it not be good to sit down together? His answer – that talking together is not useful without a set agenda – left me unsatisfied. I have to agree with Ryabkov on this one, that talking is better than not talking.
Iran’s nuclear programme: situation not yet hopeless
Posted: 31/08/2012 Filed under: Gulf and Middle East Security, Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation | Tags: enriched uranium, Fordow, IAEA, Iran, nuclear, nuclear sites, US foreign policy Leave a comment »
As predicted, the latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has contributed to a push in Israel and parts of the US for preventive military action. Since May, Iran has installed more than a thousand new centrifuges in the underground facility at Fordow, doubling the number there since the last IAEA report in May.
In a pre-emptive move of their own, White House officials gave their own spin to the latest developments several days before the IAEA released the report. While not underplaying their concern over Iran’s continued defiance, the Obama team noted that the new numbers are not a ‘game changer’. The new centrifuges are not (yet) being used for enrichment and the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium has not grown since May because half of it has been converted to an oxide form for use in fuel plates.
The danger posed by Iran’s nuclear programme is heightening incrementally: the numbers grow arithmetically, not by orders of magnitude. Mark Fitzpatrick, in a new article for Al-Monitor questions the wisdom of a war over a 10% increase in centrifuges. A proportionate response would be to increase the sanctions pressure on Iran, which has so far not made good use of diplomacy.
Read the full article at Al-Monitor
A movement aligns its sights in Tehran
Posted: 24/08/2012 Filed under: Adelphi books, Gulf and Middle East Security, Non-Proliferation | Tags: Iran, NAM summit, non-aligned movement, nuclear, Tehran 1 Comment »
As the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) prepares to open its 16th conference in Tehran this Sunday, attention has focused on who will be attending (UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and new Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi ), who’s not attending (new North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) and what the implications will be for Iran, as the host country, in avoiding isolation over its nuclear programme.
Yet there is more to the movement.
Read the rest of this entry »
Israeli war drums threaten autumn strike
Posted: 14/08/2012 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation, US | Tags: air strike, Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, Iran, Israel, nuclear 3 Comments »
With limited air-refuelling planes, Israel cannot conduct a sustained campaign against Iranian nuclear sites
By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
The debate about whether to attack Iran is again dominating Israeli media. The government speaks of a deadline measured in weeks. Although the national security establishment is solidly opposed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made it clear that the decision will be made by the political leadership. As yet, there is no consensus in the eight-member security cabinet for a strike, and apparently no majority either. The public at large is opposed to unilateral action (46% opposed, 32% in favour, according to one poll).
There is surely an element of bluff whenever Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak talk about the military option. Yet they also are determined not to allow Israel to fall under an Iranian nuclear shadow nor to put Israel’s security entirely in US hands.
Closing the deal with Iran
Posted: 06/08/2012 Filed under: Andrew Parasiliti, Gulf and Middle East Security, US | Tags: Iran, non-proliferation, NPT, nuclear, nuclear talks, P5+1 Leave a comment »
Saeed Jalili, of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and the West’s chief nuclear negotiator Catherine Ashton at talks in Moscow in June
By Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US; Corresponding Director IISS-Middle East
There could yet be a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme between Iran and the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany; led in talks by the EU). The endgame, however, needs to be transparent: a comprehensive package that includes sanctions relief in return for Iran’s closing the nuclear file. Diplomacy with Iran should be seen as a process, with benchmarks and objectives, like any other high-stakes negotiation. These benchmarks would include a compromise on Iran’s right to enrichment; agreement on the latest fuel-swap proposal; a strategic pause in both Iranian enrichment and further sanctions; Iran’s involvement in regional security dialogue, including on Syria; and sanctions relief as a clear outcome for Iranian cooperation.
Talking with the Iranian media
Posted: 21/06/2012 Filed under: Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation, US | Tags: Fordow, Iran, journalism, nuclear, Parchin Leave a comment »By Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme
Given the depth of distrust and misunderstanding between Iran and the West, I try to take whatever opportunities present themselves for communication. And having been enjoined from official contacts with Iranians during the 26 years that I represented Uncle Sam, it’s a welcome liberation.
I particularly appreciate opportunities to speak to the Iranian public. So when the BBC Persian service, VOA or other Iran-directed broadcasts ask for an interview, I accommodate. I don’t see much value in giving interviews to Iranian English media outlets like Press TV that are outwardly a direct propaganda arm of the regime. But I do talk with the state Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) because their stories are usually for both domestic and international audiences.
Giving interviews to IRNA can be fraught, though, and on both sides. On the eve of the Moscow talks, an IRNA journalist posed 13 questions to me about the West’s position. I tethered my answers to orthodoxy, knowing that any hint of disagreement with Washington’s views would be highlighted and possibly taken out of context.
An opportunity for EU action in North Korea
Posted: 18/06/2012 Filed under: Asia Pacific, Europe, Mark Fitzpatrick, Non-Proliferation | Tags: EU, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, North Korea, nuclear, Soft power Leave a comment »
The bête noire of the global non-proliferation regime, North Korea has defeated every effort to rein in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and illicit arms trade, argues Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the IISS non-proliferation programme, in a new paper for the EU-Non Proliferation Consortium.
Neither sanctions, incentives nor ‘strategic patience’ have succeeded in bringing about anything more than a temporary stall in the development of these weapon systems. There appears to be no prospect that North Korea would barter its nuclear arsenal for diplomatic or economic gain.
Having fewer stakes in North East Asia than the actors in the Six-Party Talks process, the European Union has played, at most, a supporting role, providing aid when incentives were called for and applying sanctions when that was in the script, while consistently promoting human rights.
Yet, suggests Fitzpatrick, if North Korea moves under new leadership towards market reforms, in order to overcome its poverty trap, there may be opportunities for a greater EU role. Whether in conjunction with the EU’s closer relations with South Korea or through finally establishing a delegation office in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, a more direct application of European soft power would better position the EU to assist the Korean Peninsula in future crises and to benefit from any positive turn of events.
IISS Strategic Dossier: North Korean Security Challenges
