By Antonio Sampaio, Research Assistant, Survival and the Armed Conflict Database
Enrique Pena Nieto (above), the winner of Sunday’s presidential election in Mexico, has been remarkably short on details over his promise to reduce drug-related violence. For any strategy to be successful, there must be a clear understanding of the tactics adopted by the drug cartels in Mexico and the purpose of their gruesome acts of violence, such as beheading, mutilating and dumping bodies on the streets.
In an article published on the Kings of War blog (from the War Studies Department at King’s College London) I argue that violence has become a key political communication tactic, used by drug groups to negotiate their positions in the drug market. The recent proliferation of small criminal groups in Mexico has turned brutality into the most effective demonstration of power. Mass killings, the hanging of corpses from bridges and the frequent mounting of threatening banners at crime scenes all highlight a criminal group’s ability to wield hard power and hold territories.
Crucially, these methods also serve to intimidate the public in a specific area or compel authorities to change policies, in a style similar to traditional conceptions of political terrorism.
Such methods have now become the prevalent fighting technique and communication channel for drug groups in Mexico. Countering them will be one of the top challenges for Pena Nieto in the months and years to come.
Read the full blog post.
By Antonio Sampaio, Research Assistant, Survival and the Armed Conflict Database
The Economist has dubbed it ‘the tormented isthmus‘. It is the most murderous region on earth: the ‘northern triangle’ of Central America formed by Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The bloody drugs war that has raged in neighbouring Mexico since 2006 has spilled over into a region already destabilised by years of civil war in the 1980s, plagued by local gangs and corrupt institutions, and with too few police.
By Virginia Comolli, Research Associate
For those studying Afghanistan, the drugs trade is such a pervasive feature of the nation’s economy, politics, security and society that separating it from counter-insurgency (COIN) and diplomatic efforts is simply unthinkable. Yet the subject of counter-narcotics (CN) was notably absent from the agenda of last month’s NATO Summit in Chicago.
The IISS has acknowledged the difficulties of conducting counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations simultaneously; in most situations, the latter usually take a back seat. Nonetheless, the security implications of the illicit market make it a good time to assess current strategies and the ‘Afghanisation’ of policy, as well as to discuss ongoing international cooperation and the future prospects for Afghan counter-narcotics policy. And these were exactly the sort of discussions that the IISS Transnational Threats and Political Risk research programme and Dr David Bewley-Taylor of Swansea University facilitated when they recently hosted an off-the-record ‘Colloquium on counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan: transition and beyond’. (Dr Bewley-Taylor’s involvement was part of a project funded by the Open Society Foundations’ Global Drug Policy Program and the colloquium was supported by the International Drug Policy Consortium.)
Nigel Inkster, the IISS’s Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, has a piece in Foreign Policy examining the failure of the drugs war in Afghanistan. The article – which draws on Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: the Problems of Prohibition, a recent Adelphi book Inkster co-authored with Virginia Comolli – looks at the failure of eradication programmes, the limited quantities of trafficked drugs seized, and the largely fruitless efforts to persuade Afghan farmers to grow less profitable or less hardy crops.
Afghanistan is the source of around 60% of the planet’s illicit opium and 80% of illegal heroin, he writes. ‘The United Nations recently reported there had been a 61% rebound in opium production in 2011, and prices were soaring. This is a worrying trend, which seems set to continue after NATO troops leave.’
But with so many vested interests in the trade inside Afghanistan, and global demand for this highly profitable, highly transportable commodity remaining strong, can there ever be a solution? Maybe, suggests Inkster, ‘but not while current conditions of high insecurity and pervasive corruption persist’…
Violence related to the illegal drugs trade should prompt a rethink of global drugs policy, IISS Director for Transnational Threats and Political Risk Nigel Inkster and IISS Research Analyst Virginia Comolli said at the US launch of their Adelphi book, Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The Problems of Prohibition, at IISS-US last week.
As Inkster and Comolli explained, the prohibition of drugs was originally intended to reduce social ills associated with drug use. However, because drugs fell into the class of goods that were easy to conceal during transport, the global ‘prohibition regime’ had not succeeded in its purpose. Rather, it has only served to create a lucrative and illegal drugs smuggling industry.
Latin American leaders have said recently that the West’s ‘war on drugs’ has failed, and a new book from the IISS agrees. At this week’s launch of Drugs, insecurity and failed states: The problems of prohibition, IISS expert and former MI6 deputy director Nigel Inkster said a new approach was needed in which drugs were treated as an issue to be managed rather than as a problem to be solved. Co-author Virginia Comolli pointed out that since the ‘war on drugs’ began in 1961 with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to deter trafficking and possession, none of the international treaty’s objectives had been achieved.
Worse, both authors said, banning drugs had fuelled violence and instability in the developing world, through the creation of a global black market dominated by powerful criminal groups. In some countries there had been ‘state capture’, or subversion of institutions, by criminal networks. Other nations, where drugs now overshadowed legitimate businesses, were surviving on ‘junkie economies’.
By Virginia Comolli, Research Analyst, IISS
The summit took place in the Colombian city of Cartagena on 14–15 April, and included 34 regional heads of state. It followed months of anticipation during which presidents and senior politicians from the countries most affected by drug-related violence had spoken out in favour of a review of the prohibition regime and the end of the ‘war on drugs’ in its current form. The consensus among them was that the existing one-size-fits-all approach structured around strong law-enforcement measures has had many unintended negative consequences, especially in the developing world.
Since pushing the need for a new approach to drugs control at the annual session in Vienna of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia has become a key spokesperson on drug-policy reform. His country has first-hand experience of the corruption, violence and instability that the drugs trade can bring.
Colombia’s ambassador to London and aide to the president, Mauricio Rodriguez Munera, has been just as vocal as Santos in his calls for a new approach to the drugs trade. In recent interviews he has stressed that while there is no doubt that the war on drugs has failed, a wholly convincing alternative model does not yet exist. Rodriguez has suggested that any new examination of policy should be led by experts and based on facts, and should avoid the high emotion of celebrity-led debates. It should also take into account the needs of those who are suffering as a result of current policy.
This shift of opinion coincides with the launch of the latest Adelphi book Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: the Problems of Prohibition which provides hard evidence of the impact of prohibition on drug-producing states, such as Colombia and Afghanistan, and transit zones such as Mexico, Central America and West Africa. Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli show how the war on drugs has penalised weak states by placing disproportionate focus on disrupting the supply of narcotics while not enough responsibility is being taken by consumer nations. The authors argue in favour of a new paradigm whereby greater efforts and more funding are channelled into development and education, and suggest that public-health programmes, rather than the criminal-justice system, should be the driving force in dealing with narcotics.